Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper by Barnett, James H., Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 3
1958
Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper
James H. Barnett Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
James H. Barnett Jr., Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper, 1 U. Rich. L. Rev. 3 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss1/3
Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper
JAmEs I. BAPN:TT, JE.
By the law of Moses, a Jewish lender who took interest from
a Jew was a usurer. Ancient Jerusalem was not a good place
to start a bank. In Virginia today the problem facing a lender
is not whether, but how much, interest can legally be taken
from a borrower. Va. Code Ann. §§6-346 and 6-347 (1950)
provide that all agreements for the loan or forbearance of
money at a greater rate than 6 per cent shall be illegal as to
all interest. Early statutes against usury in England applied
stiff civil and criminal sanctions to offenders. The modern
tendency is toward lighter penalties. There are three main
lines of authority as to the extent to which usury may be a
defense to the borrower. A usurious agreement is (1) void as
to principal and interest, (2) illegal as to all interest, or (3)
illegal only as to the excess of interest above the legal rate.
Virginia followed the first line until 1872, when the second
line was adopted with this qualification, that a borrower who
has paid the loan and later seeks relief can, if suit is brought
within one year thereafter, recoyer only the excess of interest
above the legal rate. Va. Code Ann. §6-350 (1950). The change
in attitude against the exaction of high interest is illustrated
by sections 6-253 and 6-348 of this Code, which permit indus-
trial loan associations, banks, and brokers to exact from
borrowers interest substantially in excess of 6 per cent even
though they do not comply with the Small Loan Act (sections
6-274 to 6-338).
This monograph attempts to explore the nature of certain
transactions in negotiable paper. In the transactions under
consideration the plaintiff admittedly would qualify as a
holder in due course under section 62 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, hereafter referred to as the NIL. In Lynch-
burg National Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652 (1895), it was held that
the maker's defense of usury between himself and the payee
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was not good against a subsequent holder in due course. The
validity of that holding is not questioned here. It is important
to distinguish the defense asserted in the unusual situations
discussed herein from that in the Scott case, supra. In both,
violation of the statute against usury was the defense; in the
former, however, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff, a
holder in due course, was a participant, though unwilling, in
a usurious transaction and was therefore subject to the civil
sanctions provided in the usury statute. Since emphasis will
be placed on the case law in Virginia with only brief reference
to decisions from other states, the reader, if interested, will
find helpful discussions in Annot., 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 211 (1913) ;
Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1447 (1920); 55 Am. Jur., Usury §§26 and
27 (1939); 29 A. & E. Enc. Law 473-78 (2d ed. 1896); 1 Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments c. 23 (6th ed. 1919); Weinstein,
"When a Bill or Note Represents an Usurious Contract," 5
Tul. L. Rev. 211 (1931).
What is usury? Except in the three problems herein con-
sidered, the test is simple, and no difficulty is met in applying
the statutes against usury. The following illustration may be
of interest:
Suppose M signs and delivers to P a note for $1000 due one
year from date with interest at 10 per cent. Is the provision
for interest legal? The following extracts taken from Graeme
v. Adams, 23 Gratt. (64 Va.) 225, 234 (1873), supply the
answer:
Usury can only attach to a loan of money; or to the
forbearance of a debt.... [O]n a contract to secure the
price or value of work and labor done or to be done, or of
property sold, the contracting parties may agree upon
one price if cash be paid, and upon as large an addition to
the cash price as may suit themselves, if credit be given;
and it is wholly immaterial whether the enhanced price
be ascertained by the simple addition of a lumping sum
to the cash price, or by a percentage thereon. In neither
case is the transaction usurious. It is neither a loan or the
forbearance of a debt, but simply the contract price of
work and labor done or property sold....
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On the other hand, a note for $2000 due one year from date
without interest may or may not be usurious depending upon
the facts giving rise to its execution. If the maker owed the
payee a debt of $1500 now due and gaVe the $2000 note pur-
suant to the payee's promise to forbear suit until its maturity,
it would be a forbearance at an illegal rate of interest though
the note is stated in terms of principal.
I. M, for the accommodation of P, signs and delivers to P
a note for $1000 payable to P or order one year from date
without interest. P indorses the note in blank and delivers it
to X, his agent, to sell at the best price obtainable. H pays X
$900 and takes delivery. How much can H at maturity recover
from l or from P, (a) when H at the time of negotiation was
aware of all facts stated? (b) when H believed it was valid
business paper and X was the owner?
(a) Perhaps all courts would hold that H participated in an
illegal loan to P because, knowing of the accommodation as
well as the agency of X, he knew or should have known that
P and X had no enforceable rights against M, the surety for
P, and in short that he was really lending $900 to P who has
agreed to repay him $1000 one year later. The rights of H
would depend upon which main line of authority prevails in
the particular jurisdiction.
(b) H appears to be a holder in due course. Will the law
accord to him the rights he expected to acquire? Only two
views are discussed below.
New York view: H is a lender in a loan transaction. His
belief that he was purchasing a business note from X, the
owner, would be immaterial. Since the interest P agreed to pay
exceeded the legal rate, H has participated in an illegal trans-
action. This view is supported by the weight of authority. The
result is based on the premise that neither P nor X had rights
against M, so it could not be a sale; therefore it must be a loan.
The adoption of this premise has led the New York court to
conclusions that seem arbitrary at best. Where M. delivers a
business note to P on an oral condition that rights will not
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arise in the payee unless and until M has sold a certain chattel
to Y, and P-in violation of this condition, not performed-
negotiates the note to H, who pays $900 believing that P has
effective rights against M, H is tarred with usury. Eastman v.
Shaw, 65 N. Y. 522 (1875). But suppose P secured the note
from Al by a fraudulent warranty of a chattel sold and P
negotiates the same to H, a holder in due course, who pays
$900. H can recover the face amount from MA. (The peculiar
rule as to the amount H can recover from P is discussed under
II below.) If, prior to P's negotiation to H, M had taken effec-
tive steps to rescind the delivery of the note, H would, it seems,
be a party to a usurious transaction. See Joy v. Diefendorf,
130 N. Y. 6 (1891).
Virginia view: H is a purchaser in a transaction of sale.
There is no usury. The leading cases, Taylor v. Bruce, Gilm.
(21 Va.) 42 (1829); H7hitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. (26 Va.)
333 (1827); and Brummel & Co. v. Enders, Sutton & Co., 18
Gratt. (59 Va.) 873 (1868), cover 186 pages in the reports and
include ten opinions. All in all eleven judges participated,
seven voting with the majority while four dissented. All three
cases lay down the same broad principle: that H is not a par-
ticipant in a usurious transaction. Only the Withworth case
will be discussed here. The five opinions in this case, covering
nearly one hundred pages, indicate prolonged discussion, ex-
tensive research, and careful consideration. The problem in-
volves the application of some of the cardinal principles of
negotiable paper.
The lower court had given judgment for H, the plaintiff,
against the maker on a special verdict, which was not set out
in the report, though it was fully discussed. It is rather singu-
lar that both of the dissenting judges thought that under
the special verdict the jury had found that H had notice of
the accommodation as well as the agency of X. The three
judges who voted for an affirmance of the judgment took the
view that H had bought the note "ignorant of the character
of the note, of the purpose for which it was made, and of the
persons for whose benefit it was sold." Pp. 396-97, 409, 421.
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The majority placed the problem under 1(b) above. The dis-
senting judges placed the problem under I(a), but held that
even if problem I(b) was applicable, judgment for H should be
reversed. See the following extract from the dissenting opinion
of Judge Carr at p. 340:
But, if I should be wrong in this [that under the special
verdict H had notice], there are two other grounds, on
which, it seems to me, that the appellants must succeed.
1. This being accommodation paper, was never an
available negotiable note, until it was discounted by John-
son [H]; and that discount being at a premium higher
than the legal rate, the note was usurious and void; and
this, though Johnson did not know that it was accom-
modation paper.
2. Though the note should be considered perfect and
available as between Wilson & Orr [P] and Whitworth
& Yancey [M], yet as the transaction by which it was
passed from the payees to Johnson, was a discount beyond
legal interest, and so usurious, no subsequent holder could
maintain an action on it.
Judge Carr in amplifying the second ground above held that
the statute made the indorsement of P void to the same extent
as if it had been forged. This was perhaps justified, assuming
there was usury, since the statute in 1827 made not only the
contract but any transfers under it void. Apparently the Code
of 1849 eliminated the provision as to transfers but still made
the contract void. If, still accepting the view of the dissent,
there was usury, the same result would not have been reached
under the Code of 1849. A general indorsement is both a
promise and a transfer. The avoidance of the promise leaves
the writing still effective as a change of tenor and the delivery
pursuant to it is a transfer.
In his dissent Judge Green, but not Judge Carr, agreed that
the intent of the lender was material, that if he did not intend
to lend it would not be usury. He admitted that according to
the law merchant the note in the hands of a holder in due
course imported a consideration that could not be questioned,
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and further the good faith purchaser could deal with an agent
as owner; that if these rules were applicable to this case then
any inquiry as to facts of usury would be precluded. P. 365.
He maintained, however, the novel proposition that the statute
against usury had made an exception to the principles of the
law merchant and substituted the rules of the common law:
By the law merchant, a bona fide holder of a bill en-
dorsed in blank, may acquire title from a person having
himself no title, and even from one who stole the bill.
But upon common law principles, no man can transfer
more right than he has; and whoever deals with an agent
having no title, even without notice of his agency, and
with a belief that he is dealing with him as principal, in
effect deals with the real principal, and acquires the title
or not. . . according to his authority or not. (P. 336).
The majority held that the negotiation to H could not be a
loan if H intended to purchase. A distinction was made be-
tween a mistake as to the legal effect of a transaction and a
mistake as to the facts. This example was given: the payee,
believing that a maker can sell his own note, takes the same at
a greater discount than the legal rate. The transaction would
be a usurious loan even though the parties did not believe they
were lending because they "have intentionally done that which
the law makes a loan." P. 415.
The following extracts from the opinion of Judge Cabell
are in part his answer to the argument of Judge Green:
The note was unavailable before it was negotiated for
value. But whether the note was valid and available after-
ward, or void for usury, depended, not upon the rate of
discount but upon the character of the negotiation as a
contract of sale, or a contract of loan .... [B]y the rules
of the law merchant, every bill imports a consideration
not to be questioned, in the hands of a purchaser for
valuable consideration; every endorser in blank ... even
if the bill was an accommodation bill, makes it, thereby,
payable to bearer, and enables a purchaser for valuable
consideration, to deal with him as owner.., as if the bill
had been originally given for full value....
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I readily grant, that the statute of usury does constitute'
an exception to the rules of the law merchant ...
But how far does the exception extend7
- . . [The statute] allows him . . . to give evidence of
every fact that will conduce to prove the usury.., because
the question, whether usury, or no usury, depends upon
the intention to lend: and it is impossible that a man's
intention can be proved, in the slightest degree, by facts
of which he had no knowledge. (Pp. 416-18).
These quotations go to the heart of the problem. Judge
Cabell rejected wholly the argument of Judge Green that the
statute had grafted upon the law of negotiable paper the
common law doctrine of constructive notice as to facts tending
to prove usury. He admitted that the statute had curtailed the
rights of a holder in due course by affording the maker in a
contract of usury an absolute defense, but rejected the argu-
ment that this had been brought about through the adoption of
the fiction of constructive notice to the holder. Judge Cabell
might have used the illustration of a note signed by a married
woman. In such case the holder in due course would be denied
recovery against her not through the fiction of constructive
notice of the marriage, but on the basis that all holders bear
the risk that apparent obligors may have the defense of in-
capacity under the common law.
Williston supports the Virginia rule and criticizes the cases
contra as follows:
But such decisions seem to rest upon a misapprehension
of the nature of accommodation paper, which should be
regarded as subject to the personal defense of lack of
consideration while in the hands of the accommodated
party, than as having no existence until negotiated by him.
6 Williston, Contracts § 1690 (rev. ed. 1936).
Does the accommodated party have something to sell? Ac-
commodation is not an equitable defense, even as against one
who buys before maturity with notice, provided the negotia-
tion is not at a discount greater than the legal rate. Considera-
tion will be given below to the situation where the payee of a
note signed only by the maker, who has an absolute defense
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either by common law or statute, negotiates the same to H who
takes at a discount greater than the legal rate. There the
holder who pays even the face amount admittedly acquires
no rights against M. The problem of accommodation paper
raises a question, similar to that often debated, as to the
extent of the liability of one who, selling a chattel or a
negotiable instrument, gives an implied warranty of title.
Clearly if the bona fide purchaser did not acquire title by the
purchase the warranty is broken. Suppose the seller did not
have title, but for one of many .possible reasons the purchaser
is held to have acquired title. Does he have a right against
the seller for breach of warranty on the theory that the
warranty was a representation that the seller had title? If
the view be taken that the warrantor merely represents or
promises that the purchaser will get title, then there is no
breach of warranty. Without discussing the two views further,
it may be suggested that as a practical matter all the purchaser
is interested in is the acquisition of the rights of an owner.
The weight of authority under Problem l(b) supports the
New York rule.
II. P, the order payee of a valid note for $1000 payable
one year from date, indorses the same to H, who pays $900
therefor. Is this usury? How much can H recover from M, the
maker? From P?
New York view: This is not usury. H can recover the face
amount from M. H can recover from P only the amount paid
to him. The majority of jurisdictions which, like New York,
find no usury, nevertheless allow H to recover the face amount
from P. This is the measure of recovery provided in sections
61 and 66 of the NIL.
Virginia view: Most but not all of the judges in Whitworth
v. Adams, supra, assumed that there would be usury between
P and H. Pp. 354, 379, and 419; but see p. 388. If there is
usury between P and H, then in 1827 H could not recover any-
thing from P, but today could recover $900 (which is the same
result as reached in New York but for quite different reasons).
Today in Virginia usurious agreements are illegal as to all
interest but not as to principal.
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W hat of H's right against M? If Judge Carr was correct as
to the effect of the statute on a usurious transaction, then it
was void not only as to the indorser 's contract, but also as to
the transfer, so title remained in P. Judge Coalter disagreed.
Pp. 391-96. Under the present statute it seems clear that H
can recover the face amount from If because there was no
usury between M and H. In Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank,
160 Va. 597 (1933), the facts fit the problem as stated in II,
above, with this addition, viz., P secured the note from M by
fraud. H recovered the face amount from M and the court
affirmed the same. The decision is supported by the weight of
authority. The court assumed without citing any Virginia case
that the transaction between P and H was usurious. Bank of
Radford v. Kirby, 100 Va. 498 (1902) held there was usury
between H and P, citing dicta in Whitworth v. Adams, supra;
Bell v. Calhoun, 8 Gratt. (49 Va.) 22 (1851); and 3 Minor,
Institutes 306-08 (1895). In the Moore case, the court in dictum
suggested that in any event H could recover the principal from
M ($900 in problem II). The court discussed the problem on
the assumption that it was a loan, but as the trial court had
held that it was a sale and the defendant had not shaped his
pleadings, instructions, or exceptions on the theory that there
was usury, the court said it was useless to pursue the question
further. P. 606. The court then quoted from Williston, Con-
tracts, but did not include a statement by the author criticizing
the Virginia rule. What light does this case throw on the
present law in Virginia? Perhaps, to use the expression of
backwoods wrestlers, "It was a dog fall."
The Virginia rule, which is not the weight of authority,
seems unsound in theory and unrealistic in practice. The
owner of a valid bearer note can by a sale without indorsement
or by an indorsement without recourse sell at any discount
without violation of the usury statute, yet if the purchaser
demands and secures a general indorsement the transaction
by some alchemy has been changed from a sale into a loan.
Suppose S sells a chattel to B for $500 and as an inducement
to B gives a warranty of quality. The chattel delivered is not
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as warranted yet has an admitted value of $400; it is agreed
that had the chattel been as warranted its value would have
been $600. How much can B, who elects to retain and sue for
damages, recover? Two hundred dollars, according to the
prevailing view as well as under section 69(7) of the Sales
Act. B has not violated the statute. Compare this with problem
II, where P sold, not pledged, the note for $900 and as an
inducement to the purchaser promised that if the maker didn't
perform his contract by paying the face amount he would
guarantee that H would realize that amount. Isn't that in
substance what S did by his warranty? It is assumed that this
is not an attempt to evade the statute by giving the form of a
sale to what is in fact a loan. The promise of P may appear
to have some of the characteristics of a loan, but the main
transaction was a sale to which the promise is subsidiary. One
hundred years ago this problem under the severe first line
of authority noted at the beginning of this paper would involve
a substantial sum. Today under our less severe sanction the
amount involved would not in most instances justify litigation.
III. M, in payment of money lost at cards, signs and
delivers to P, the payee, a note for $1000 due one year from
date. P, before maturity, indorses the same to H, who pays
$900 therefor in good faith without notice of the consideration
between the maker and the payee. Va. Code Ann. § 11-14
(1950) provides in substance that gaming contracts shall be
"utterly void." The weight of authority under the NIL, dis-
tinguishing between mere illegality and statutory invalidity,
holds that under similar statutes the maker has a legal defense
good against a holder in due course. The object of the statutes
would appear to be the prevention of gambling transactions by
punishing the parties thereto rather than shielding the obligor
as one imposed upon. The effect of the prevailing rule is to
punish the holder, the only one of the parties deserving pro-
tection, while shielding the law-breaking maker. Section 11-14
should be amended to provide that the obligation is void as to
all except holders in due course and those who are permitted
to claim shelter through them; in that way the cardinal princi-
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ple of the NIL as well as the object of the statute against
gambling can be achieved. The Virginia court has not passed
on this point.
In problem I(b) P had something to sell even though he
could not recover from M; a holder taking from him, even
with notice- of the accommodation character of the paper,
could recover the face amount from M if he paid at least 94
per cent of that amount, while in problem III M is not liable
even to a holder in due course. Williston, who favors the Vir-
ginia view, discussed above under problem I(b), has this
comment about problem III: I I But if the instriunent except the
endorser's obligation is wholly void, the transaction even
though intended as a sale is in effect a loan to him, and where
the discount is excessive, has been held usurious." 6 Williston,
Contracts §1690 (rev. ed. 1936). Only two cases are cited by
the author, both from New York. Decisions from New York
cannot be persuasive since the courts of that state hold that
there is usury in problem I(b). There are no decisions in
Virginia covering problem III, and furthermore it should be
noted that as long as Virginia follows the minority view
discussed above under problem II, the court would never come
to grips with the present problem because there would be usury
even if M were liable to H. Problem III cannot, it appears, be
raised by any set of facts without at the same time bringing
in problem II. Such would be the case, for example, if X-a
third person-were introduced into problem III between P and
H (as where P in the illustration indorsed the note in blank,
but it was stolen from him by X, who delivered the same to H,
who took as holder in due course). Prior to the adoption of
the NIL, both M and P would have a good defense against H.
Under section 16 of the NIL, P's defense of lack of delivery
would not be good against H; consequently there is substan-
tially the same problem as in problem I(b). The following
question remains: Should a court following the majority view
under problem II hold that H is a participant in a usurious
transaction in problem III?
If H had purchased at a discount less than the legal rate,
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no question of usury could be raised. A purchase at a large
discount does not as a matter of law prevent one from being a
holder in due course. At most it is evidence tending to show
either lack of good faith or absence of an intent to bargain.
Fleshman v. Bibb, 118 Va. 582 (1916). It is assumed that H is
a holder in due course. The majority of the judges in the
Whitworth case, supra, rejected the novel proposition ad-
vanced by Judge Green that the statute against usury had
grafted upon the law of negotiable paper the common law
doctrine of constructive notice.
Is the intent to lend one of the requisites of usury? The
authorities generally agTee with Judge Cabell (see above) that
the intent of the lender, H in the problem, is necessary.
Williston, Contracts § 1698 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Restatement, Con-
tracts § 526, Special Note. Judge Cabell distinguished between
the lender's mistake as to the legal effect of a transaction and
his mistake as to a collateral fact. If the transaction between
P and H cannot be a sale because P had nothing to sell, and
cannot be a loan due to H's mistake as to the validity of M's
obligation, what is it? It does not seem helpful to speculate
about the nature of this hybrid transaction. Would it not be
better to seek the object back of the statute against usury?
Granted that it was designed to punish those who have the
expectation of high interest that a lending mind begets, the
punishment of a holder in due course who has already been
impaled on the statute against gambling seems rather out-
rageous treatment of the most favored plaintiff in the law.
The holder in due course generally is accorded the rights he
expected to secure. True, there are exceptions under common
law, as in the case of infants, married women, and those held
to be incompetent in fact to contract, and by statute in the
illustrations discussed above and others as a discharge under
the bankruptcy law. In other situations this knight in shining
armor has prevailed over defenses that would defeat the
ordinary plaintiff. It is suggested, therefore, that to test the
transaction between P and H by what P has a power to pass is
improper. We are dealing with no ordinary claimant; this
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plumed knight is the champion of the business world. The
transactions entered into by him should be judged as to their
nature by what they appeared to be and not by facts unknown
to him. The cases which defeat a holder in due course because
he is considered a participant in a usurious transaction are
but a variant of the minority view that a payee cannot be a
holder in due course. When a court holds that a subsequent
holder in due course cannot recover from a maker who has
established that there was usury between him and the payee
because the local statute provides that contracts which are
tainted with usury shall be "utterly void," the decision raises
only a question of policy back of the statute. On the other
hand, when a court holds that a holder in due course is subject
to the sanctions of a statute against usury because he was a
participant, though unwitting, in a usurious transaction, the
decision rejects one of the cardinal principles recognized for
more than two centuries for the protection of this most favored
plaintiff by forcing upon him a transaction he never objec-
tively or subjectively became a party to.
Plea of Confession and Avoidance
No secrets are revealed when it is suggested rumors abound
that instructors in Negotiable Paper are at best a queer lot,
yet harmless and not to be taken seriously save at examination
time. The writer fears he has played into the hands of the
Philistines and cannot now rely on the Fifth Amendment. His
only comfort comes from the realization that most, if not all,
potential readers will be diverted by the title.
